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IN THE COURT

APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

T , T T T TAM HORTON,
Appellant,
Case N o . 920 2 45 CA
Category No. 2

vs.
STATE OF" UTAH,
Appel1ee,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION
This

Court

has jurisdiction

to hear

this

case pursuant to

Title 7 8 , Chapter 2a, Section 3 (2) ( t ) , Utah Code Annotated.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REV IJEW
1.

Did the trial

court

commit

error

in ruling that

police

o f f i c e r s a c t e d i n q o o d ii a i t h 111 t h e i i: e x e c u t i o n o f t h e d e f e c t i v e
:. eat oli w a i i i ri* i '.\ - I M
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D i d t h e trial
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court

affidavit of Harmon Meinhait,
3
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exclude

the testimony by

deceased.

I) i d 11 i e 11: i a ] c o i 11 t w t o n g 1 y i: e f u s € • a c ' o n t :i i 11 ;i a i l c e t c a ] 1 o w

C1 a ra E va Me i nhar t
4.

wrongly

hi d
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exh i i> i I

vehicle alleged
stolen property.

a v i t a1 a1i bi w i t n e s s t o t e s t i f y i n pe r son.
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d

to have been used

i etuse

to

y \ n »L i iy L a p t i

defendantf s

accept
111 I I i c

in transportinq

I i i m 11

f

I he

1 he allegedly

5.

Did the trial court wrongly sentence the defendant to

consecutive

terms

in the

excess

of

the

thirty

year

statutory

limitation.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
See Addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Appellant was charged on July 10, 1991 in a ten count

information alleging as follows:
Count I,

Theft, a second degree felony.

Count II, Burglary, a third degree felony.
Count III, Burglary, a third degree felony.
Count IV, Theft, a third degree felony.
Count V,

Burglary, a third degree felony.

Count VI, Theft a third degree felony.
Count VII, Burglary, a third degree felony.
Count VIII, Theft, a third degree felony.
Count IX, Burglary, a third degree felony.
Count X, Theft a second degree felony.
2.

After preliminary hearing on the 23rd and 26th of July,

1992, all counts were bound over for trial except that count one
which

alleged

that

the defendant

was

a habitual

amended to delete that portion of the allegation.

criminal

was

Count six was

amended to reflect a charge of theft, a class B misdemeanor.
3.

Following arraignment, counts one and two were severed

from counts three through ten.

Separate trials were scheduled for

the two criminal incidents which were alleged.

2

4.

H e a r i :i i g w a s h e ] d ::> n

N o v e in b e :i • 7 1 h

] 9 91

o n d efendant's

mot: on to quash a search, warrant whi ch had 1: ieen issued in. the Third
Circuit

Cour t i n and for Salt

e v i d en c e

Lake County, and to suppress all

w h i c h w a s s e a z e d p \ i. r s i :i a n t

c o u i: t r i 11 e d

that

t • : • 1 1 i a. t w a r :i : a n t

T h e t r :i a 1

t h e s e a r c h w a r r a n t w a s i n v a, 1 i d b u t r e f u s e d t o
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exception
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5,

Defendant was acquitted at trial on counts one and two,

6

T r i a. 1 w a s set f o i I) e c embe r 5th and 6th, 19 9 J on c o un t s

three

through

ten

Tr i a 1 wa.s r e- s et
\mfinued

when

b t h a m i:; •• 1 t x a 1 was iU*c 1 a red .

On December
£ or

December

a defense

alibi

191 h

re set for January

of

] 99]

t »* 11

was

w i t n e s s , Clar a Eva Meinhar t had

s u r g e i y a n d wa1.. u n a v a i l a b l e f o r t r i a l
trial

and 2 0

T h e t:i : ial court ordered the

2nd and 3rd of 1992 .

The t r ial

cour t

i : e f i I s e d £ i 11: t in e i: c o i 11 :i i 11 I a n c e a. n d o i: d e r e d t h a. t a d e p o s i t i o n b e taken
of M r s , Meinhar t * s testimony
7.

for use at tr i al,

Trial was held on counts three through ten on January 2rd

a, n d 31: d , 1 9 9 2 b e f o r e a j i i1 : j
coun 1:s by the jur}

F o 11 o w i n g a i r e r d i c t c • f g i :i 1 1 1 y c:»n a I, !.

defendant was sentenced to ser ved one tern t of

one to f i ft. een years and si x term of i ip to five years at the Utah
S t a. t e P i: i s o i I a. 1 o i i g \ i i 11 :t. a s :i x n i o n 11 i t e i: n: i a t 11: i e U i i 11 a h C o i :i n, 1: j J a :i 1
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STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS
ThiL

i s in dpp(.-\.il

I i Miii, .1 t i n a J

yudgir*-' *

: j oniei

nf I h e

Eighth District Court of Uintah County finding • :- •- defendant gui lty
0£

one

coun

t

of Theft, a second degree
3

feiuuj,

xii violation of

Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 404, Utah Code Annotated, two counts
of Theft,

third degree felonies in violation of the same section,

one count of Theft, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of the same
section, and four counts of Burglary

of a non-dwelling,

third

degree felonies in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 202,
Utah Code Annotated, as amended.
Order on February 19, 1992.

The Court issued its Judgment and

Defendant filed a notice of appeal on

March 20, 1992.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On the night of June 16th into the 17th of 1991, a grocery

store near Vernal, Utah was burglarized.

(TR. 96-97)

in excess of $1000.00 were also stolen.

(TR. 109)

Items valued

Entry appeared

to have been accomplished by the removal of an air conditioner.
(TR. 150)
2.

The same night, a building containing several businesses

in Vernal was also broken into.

(TR. 122)

Items valued in excess

of $250.00 were taken from the "Dinah Bowl" (TR. 124) and the
"Acute Cut" beauty salon. (TR. 137)

Items valued at less than

$100.00 were taken from the "Dinah Barber Shop."

(TR. 145)

Entry

appeared to have been accomplished through a hole in the roof of
the building where an air conditioner had been removed.

(TR. 172-

173)
3.

Following a series of phone calls between Vernal City

police officer Joe Boren and an unidentified informant, officer
Boren prepared an affidavit for search warrant and presented it to
a magistrate of the Third Circuit Court in Salt Lake City, Utah on
4

July 10, 1991.

(Findings 3, 5, 6, and 10)

The magistrate signed

the search warrant.
4.

Shortly thereafter Officer Boren, accompanied by several

police officers from Uintah County, Duchesne County, the United
States Forest Service, and Salt Lake City executed the warrant at
the defendant's residence in Salt Lake City.
officers

from

specifically

Uintah

in the affidavit

warrant itself.

stolen

and

the

Forest

Service

The
were

looking for evidence from burglaries which had not

been mentioned

5.

County

(TR. 179-180)

(Finding 15)

Various
during

for search warrant nor in the

items of stolen property

the

burglaries

were

found

identified
at

the

as being

defendant's

residence as well as tools later identified by a co-defendant as
being used in the burglaries. (TR. 180-183)
6.

At about the same time, a search warrant was issued by the

Eighth Circuit Court in Uintah County for the residence in Vernal
of one Brian Winslow, an individual

also identified

Boren during the phone calls from the informant.
property

to Officer

Various items of

from the burglaries were also found at his residence.

(TR.288)
7.

The defendant and Mr. Winslow were arrested on July 11,

1991 pursuant to an arrest warrant issued by the Circuit Court.
8.

Defendant filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized

pursuant to the search warrant based on a defect in the affidavit.
The affidavit summarized

information received from an informant

that the defendant had been seen in possession of stolen property
5

and that he had been heard discussing burglaries in Vernal.

There

was nothing in the affidavit which stated when or where the stolen
item had been seen.

The affidavit did state that the defendant

lived at a certain location but said nothing about any evidence
being seen there. (Affidavit)
9.

Officer

Boren

described

himself

as

an

experienced

investigator who had prepared or assisted in the drafting of at
least two hundred search warrant affidavits.

He was familiar with

the necessity not only to specify why the evidence sought in a
search warrant should be seized, but also the necessity to state
the evidence showing why the specified location should be searched.
Officer Boren also presented the warrant

to the magistrate and

directed the execution of the warrant. (Finding 14)
10.

The Court ruled that the warrant was invalid due to its

failure to present any evidence providing probable cause as to the
location of any evidence.

(Conclusion 1)

It did find Officer

Boren had evidence that may have shown probable cause as to the
location

of

the

evidence,

but

that

the

officer

intentionally

withheld that evidence from the magistrate thereby taking the risk
that the warrant might not issue. (Findings 12, 13, 17 and 18)
With that finding, the court ruled that Officer Boren acted in good
faith reliance on the warrant once it had been signed. (Conclusion
3)

The court did not make any specific finding of objective good

faith on the part of the officer.
11.

The

evidence

presented

at

the

trial

by

the

state

consisted of the testimony of the victims, the testimony of the
6

officers who investigated the crime scenes, the testimony of Brian
Winslow, a co-defendant offered a reduction in charges in exchange
for testimony, and the items seized during the execution of the
search warrant at the defendant's home.
12.

The

witnesses.

defendant

presented

alibi

evidence

from

three

The defendant offered alibi evidence in the form of an

affidavit from Harmon Meinhart, the father in law of the defendant,
which had been signed and sworn to on August 12, 1992.
Mr. Meinhart had died in early November, 1992.

(TR. 8)

Alibi evidence was

presented by the reading of a deposition from Clara Eva Meinhart,
the mother in law of the defendant.

(TR. 324-340)

Mrs. Meinhart

had been present for the initial trial which ended in a mistrial,
but underwent surgery on or about December 16, 1992.

The Court

allowed a continuance of the December 19 trial date so that the
deposition could take place, but refused any continuance after the
2nd of January 1992.
13.

The defendant proposed exhibit number 25 as evidence in

his defense.

The proposed exhibit consisted of a photograph of the

trunk of the car alleged to have been used to transport the stolen
property with a hubcap propped up in the trunk to show scale.

A

proper foundation was laid as to the time of the photograph, the
photographer, and the true and accurate portrayal
contained

in

the photograph.

(TR.

309-310)

Upon

of the items
the

state's

objection the Court refused to admit the photograph on the basis
that the bottom of the hubcap was not in the photo and therefore
it might be possible that the photograph did not accurately show
7

the size of the trunk. (TR.311)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant claims error by the trial judge in ruling that the
good faith exception applied despite the officer's subjective
acknowledgement that the affidavit for search warrant did not
contain facts sufficient to establish probable cause.

Further,

the trial court did not make finding of good faith reliance based
on an objective standard.
Secondly, appellant claims error in that the court refused to
allow the evidence of a deceased alibi witness when there were
sufficient indicia of reliability and truthfulness presented to
allow admission under the residual hearsay exception.
Thirdly, appellant claims that error was compounded when the
companion testimony of the deceased's wife was made available to
the jury only by deposition due to the court failure to allow a
continuance sufficient for her to recover to the point of being
able to travel.
Fourthly, appellant claims error in that the court wrongly
excluded admissible photographic evidence which would have shown
the impossibility of the events testified to by the co-defendants.
Finally, appellant claims error in that the court ignored a
statutory limit of thirty years on consecutive sentencing on cases
arising out of one incident by sentencing the defendant to forty
five possible years in the penitentiary.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
8

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT OFFICER JOE BOREN AND THE
POLICE OFFICERS WHO ACCOMPANIED HIM COULD RELY IN GOOD FAITH ON THE
DEFECTIVE WARRANT WHICH WAS ISSUED BY THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT,
On July 8th and 9th, 1991, Officer Joe Boren received a series
of telephone calls from an informant.
9)

(Findings 3, 5, 6, 7, and

The as yet unidentified informant told officer Boren that she

had information about burglaries in Vernal and Duchesne.

The

informant described and named the defendant and an individual she
believed was from Vernal.

The informant described seeing some

property which matched the description of what had been taken in
from the Dinah Bowl building in Vernal.

(Finding 5)

After some

investigation by the police driver's license records, an address
in the Rose Park area of Salt Lake City was obtained for the
defendant. (Finding 4) Those facts were presented to a magistrate
in Salt Lake City by Officer Boren and a search warrant was issued
for the search of the defendant's residence. (Finding 10) With the
assistance of some Salt Lake City police officers, a Duchesne
County deputy, a Uintah County deputy, and a United States Forest
Service enforcement officer, Officer Boren directed the execution
of the search warrant.

He knew that the Uintah County deputy and

the forest service officer had accompanied him for the specific
purpose of searching for evidence which would assist in solving
other burglaries each was investigating, burglaries which had not
been mentioned in the affidavit for search warrant.

(Finding 15)

The search warrant was ruled to be invalid in that the affidavit
prepared by Officer Boren gave the magistrate no evidence to find

9

probable cause that the evidence sought was in the location for
which the warrant was sought.

(Conclusion 1)

It has been a longstanding rule in this country that when
evidence is obtained through the use of an invalid search warrant,
that evidence will be excluded from use in any trial.

The United

States Supreme Court carved out an exception to that rule in the
case of United States v. Leon, 82 L.Ed 2d 677 (1984).

The Court

ruled that the exclusionary rule, aimed at deterring unlawful
police conduct, does not bar evidence seized by officers acting in
good

faith

reliance

on a defective

warrant.

The

rule has

limitations. The officer's reliance on the magistrate's probablecause determination and on the technical sufficiency of a warrant
must be objectively reasonable.

Reliance would not be justified

in cases where the warrant was issued on an affidavit "so lacking
in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its
existence entirely unreasonable." U.S. v. Leon, supra, at p. 699.
This court has elaborated on the applicability of that rule and its
exceptions in the case of State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730 (Utah App.
1991).

In that case, this court ruled that there was nothing in

the warrant in question that would provide any basis for a finding
of probable cause to issue a nighttime search authorization.

The

court noted that the same officer prepared the affidavit, presented
it to the magistrate, and executed the warrant.
standard

requires

officers.
1985).

reasonable

knowledge

of

the

The objective
law by police

United States v. Freitas, 610 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal.

The Rowe Court, citing Freitas, ruled that since the same
10

officer prepared the affidavit, presented it to a magistrate, and
executed the warrant, there could be no finding of objective good
faith.
The logic of the Rowe decision is inescapable in this case as
well.

On an objective level, Officer Boren, if he were to be able

to rely in good faith on the warrant, must have had knowledge that
facts must be presented in a search warrant affidavit which provide
a basis for searching the particular location.
conspicuously absent from the affidavit.

Those facts were

An objective officer

would know that a warrant issued without those facts would be
defective

in its basic

probable

cause determination.

On a

subjective level as well, the knowledge possessed by Boren leads
to the same conclusion. Officer Boren stated that he had prepared
or assisted in the preparation of at least two hundred affidavits
for search warrants.

(Finding 14) He admitted that his training

in the preparation of affidavits and in the concept of probable
cause included background in the requirements for that information.
He

admitted

(Finding

12)

that

he

intentionally

omitted

In essence he knowingly

that

information.

presented

a defective

affidavit in the hope that the magistrate would not notice the
defect.

He then professes good faith reliance on a warrant that

he knew was defective.
The type of reliance which the trial court ruled to be in good
faith suggests a similar fact situation to that discussed in
footnote nine of the Rowe decision.

The court suggested that if

an officer presented a defective affidavit to a magistrate and then
11

gave a resulting invalid warrant to another officer to execute
thereby insulating the execution from the defective issuance, the
court would have no hesitation in fashioning a remedy.
While it was not briefed at the trial court, the lack of a
good faith exception under the Utah exclusionary rule was discussed
in open court and presumably was considered in the trial court's
decision. (Hearing TR. 18) No specific finding was made, however.
(See findings of fact and conslusions of law) At least one member
of the Utah Supreme Court considered the subject in the case of
State v. Mendoza, 748 P. 2d 181 (Utah 1987) in the context of an
automobile search.

Justice Zimmerman in his concurring opinion

suggested that the issue should be considered.

The exclusionary

rule under state law is more restrictive that under a purely
federal analysis. See State v. Larocco, 794 P. 2d 460 (Utah 1990).
In any event, under a either a state or

federal analysis,

Joe Boren knew or should have known that he presented insufficient
facts to the magistrate for a finding of probable cause to search
the defendant's residence.

While mere ministerial or technical

errors in the preparation or execution of a search warrant will not
necessarily invalidate a warrant, State v. Buck, 756 P. 2d 700
(Utah 1988) the defect here was not of that nature.

The only

remedy therefore for that defect is exclusion of the evidence
seized.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ADMIT THE TESTIMONY OF HARMON
MEINHART BY WAY OF AFFIDAVIT WHEN THE AFFIANT WAS DECEASED AND
THERE WERE SUFFICIENT INDICIA OF RELIABILITY AND TRUSTWORTHINESS
TO WARRANT ADMISSION.
12

On August 8, 1992, the defendant's father in law, Harmon
prepared a statement outlining his recollection of the whereabouts
of his son-in-law, William Horton and his daughter Vickie Horton
on the night of June 16, 1991, the date which the burglaries and
thefts apparently occurred.

He related that they came home to

their home adjacent to his in Salt Lake City at about 10:00 or
10:30 p.m. and were drunk.

The statement was subscribed to and

sworn before a notary public in Salt Lake City on August 12, 1991.
At the beginning of November, 1991, Mr. Meinhart died. He was thus
unavailable to testify

at trial.

The defendant

offered the

statement of Mr. Meinhart at trial based on the residual hearsay
exception, Rule 804 (b)(5), of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

(TR.8)

The Court declined to accept the evidence, ruling that since the
decedent's wife, Clara Eva Meinhart was available to testify to
much of the same recollection, the statement would not be more
probative than any other evidence that the defendant could procure.
Rule 804 of the Rules of Evidence allows for the admissibility
of statements if the declarant is unavailable.

Rule 804 (b)(5)

specifically allows for the admission of:
"A statement not specifically covered by any of the
foregoing
exceptions
but having
equivalent
circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the
statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered
than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through
reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and
the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the
statement into evidence.

13

The statement

was notarized.

It therefore

subjected

the

declarant to criminal liability if it were shown not to be true.
Section 76-8-501

of the Utah Code defines an official proceeding

to include any proceeding before an official authorized by law to
take evidence under oath including a notary.

A person is guilty

of a felony of the second degree if he makes a false statement
under oath in any official proceeding,
Code).

(Section 76-8-502, Utah

The reliability of the statement is therefore shown.

The court must examine whether or not the general purposes of
the rule and the interests of justice are served by the proffered
hearsay statement. While the use of a notarized statement does not
allow for cross-examination by the state of the witness, the state
does not have the same Constitutional
that of the defendant.

right of confrontation as

The state's right is more of a "functional"

right designed to promote reliability in the truth-finding process.
Kentucky v. Stincer, 96 L. Ed. 631, 1987.

The state's right,

whatever it may be, is not violated when out of court statements
of an unavailable witness are admitted
adequate indications
supra.

of trustworthiness.

if the statements bear
Kentucky

v. Stincer,

The state further has the right pursuant to rule 806, Utah

Rules of Evidence, to attack the credibility of the declarant by
any method which would have been available had the declarant been
available as a witness.
The Court, while it made no specific ruling as to either the
reliability of the statement or the interests of justice, did rule
that other probative evidence was available, to wit, the testimony
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of Clara Eva Meinhart.

Her testimony was not identical that of

Mr. Meinhart in that she did not see the defendant in Salt Lake
City on the night of June 16, 1991. She only heard the arguments.
She believed that she heard the defendant's voice, but it was her
husband who personally went outside and talked to the defendant.
(TR. 322-340)
The erroneous ruling not to admit the notarized statement was
compounded by the mis-trial and subsequent surgery which Mrs.
Meinhart underwent.

When it came to the actual trial, she was

unavailable to testify due to her medical condition. Her testimony
was received only by deposition.

The probative value of Mrs.

Meinhart's

by

personally.

testimony

was

diluted

her

failure

to

testify

It is at least partially for this reason, this lack

of face to face contact between a witness and a fact finder that
depositions may be of dubious value in any criminal case.

In the

Arizona case of State v. Shearer, 793 P.2d 86 (Ariz. App, 1989),
that court held that a deposition was not admissible at trial even
as former testimony.

In so ruling, the Court cited favorably dicta

from the case of United States v. Benfield, 593 F. 2d 815 (8th Cir.
1979) stating that "The right of cross-examination reinforces the
importance of physical confrontation.

Most believe that in some

undefined but real way recollection, veracity, and communication
are influenced by face to face challenge. . . . While a deposition
necessarily eliminated a face to face meeting between witness and
jury, we find no further justification for further abridgement of
the defendant's rights."
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While there may have been some basis for the Court's initial
ruling of non-admissibility of the statement, its later ruling
invalidated any rationale for that ruling. The next point of this
brief is necessarily connected to his one.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONTINUE THE TRIAL IN ORDER THAT
A CRUCIAL DEFENSE WITNESS COULD RECUPERATE SUFFICIENTLY TO ATTEND
TRIAL.
The Court expressed its concern for a quick resolution of this
case after a mistrial had been declared in the December 5-6 trial.
It was not, however, predictable that Mrs. Meinhart, a vital alibi
witness would have the surgery which confined her to her home.
Defendant requested a continuance for sufficient time to allow
her to recover and testify personally, but the court insisted that
a deposition be taken from Mrs. Meinhart and admitted at trial.
The jury was therefore deprived of the opportunity of seeing,
hearing, and evaluating the conviction, the demeanor, and the
credibility of Mrs. Meinhart.

The testimony came before the jury

by way of Mrs. Meinhart's granddaughter, Rachelle Schow, reading
the part while counsel for the state and the defendant read the
respective questions which were asked.
The importance of face to face contact between a witness and
a jury has already been mentioned, United States v. Benfield,
supra.

In this case, where there was a total conflict in the

testimony of the state's witnesses and the defendant's witnesses,
the result was dependent totally on the jury's evaluation of the
credibility of those witnesses, particularly as the state relied
16

heavily on the testimony of an accomplice who had been offered
leniency in exchange for testimony.

Any diminution of the impact

of a witness's testimony diluted defendant's chance for a fair
trial in this matter.
POINT FOUR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FAILURE TO ADMIT DEFENDANT'S
PROPOSED EXHIBIT NUMBER 25, A PHOTOGRAPH OF THE TRUNK OF THE CAR
ALLEGEDLY USED TO TRANSPORT THE STOLEN PROPERTY.
As has been previously stated, the state relied heavily on the
testimony

of

on

Brian

Winslow,

an

individual

who

admittedly

participated in all of the alleged burglaries and thefts, but who
blamed the defendant for instigating, planning, and directing the
crimes.

The accomplice

testified that

four full-sized

garbage

sacks of stolen property were placed in the trunk of a 1980 Ford
Mustang.

(TR. 246-246)

At trial, the wife of the defendant,

Vickie Horton, testified that she took a photograph of the trunk
of the mustang. (TR.309-310)

That photograph (Exhibit 25) showed

the rear of the vehicle, the back of the trunk, and a fourteen inch
hubcap

leaning on the edge of the trunk for perspective.

The

hubcap showed that the trunk was extremely shallow and thus that
it would have been impossible for the quantity of stolen items
described to have fit.

The state objected to the introduction of

the exhibit on the grounds that the bottom of the hubcap was not
visible.

It might be possible that something was sitting under it

to distort the perspective.

(TR. 311)

Despite further foundation

from the witness that there was nothing under the hubcap, and that
the

trunk

was

about

nine

inches
17

deep

(as

indicated

by

the

comparison to the hubcap) the trial court refused to admit the
proposed exhibit. At least one state's witness (Officer Boren) had
participated in the search of the defendant's home and the trunk
of the mustang (Finding 15), so the state had an awareness that the
testimony concerning the nine inch depth was truthful.

Despite

this knowledge, the court's ruling allowed the state to appeal to
the jury's common knowledge that there could not be only a nine
inch trunk.

Counsel for the state specifically stated in argument

"We know it is impossible." (TR. 400-401) The failure to admit the
photograph
argument

of the trunk

to

the

jury,

therefore
but

also

opened

the door

allowed

the

to a false

state

to

argue

forcefully that Mrs Horton was a liar and could not be truthful in
any

of

her

testimony

including

the

alibi

evidence

that

she

presented.
It is clear that photographs are admissible evidence in a
trial if they have probative value and if they are not inflammatory
or prejudicial in nature to a degree that their probative value is
outweighed.

The cumulative effect of photographic evidence is also

to be considered.
Courts

outside

State v. Laffertv, 749 P 2d. 1239, (Utah 1988).

of

Utahs

admitting photographs.

have

also

ruled

the

and

may

Loscutoff,

be

State v. Montes, 667 P. 2d 191 (Ariz. 1983).

introduced

661 P.

for

to corroborate a

Generally, a photograph may be admitted even though
matter

reasons

Photographs have been held to be relevant

to illustrate how a crime was committed
witness' testimony.

on

2d

274

into

evidence

(Colo., 1983).
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in words.

its subject
People

Photographs

may

v.
be

admitted if it would be helpful to permit a witness to supplement
his description by their use.
(Colo., 1980).
photographs

People v. Mattas, 618 P. 2d 675

The proper test for admission of reconstructed

of scenes is whether

conditions are the same or

substantially similar to the events depicted; minor differences go
to the weight of the evidence rather than to the admissibility.
State v. Kendig, 666 P 2d. 233 (Kansas, 1983).

In this case, where

a proper foundation was laid, the objection of the State should
have been argued as weight rather thatn admissibility.
While it is true that the trial judges have great discretion
in ruling what evidence is admissible at trial, and while those
rulings are not to be disturbed absent clear error (State v. Gray,
717 P. 2d 1313 [Utah 1986]) an abuse of discretion should still be
examined.

The offered photograph was relevant in that it tended

to disprove the state's prime witness.
not inflammatory in any way.

It was probative.

It was not cumulative.

showed the state's primary witness to be a liar.

It was

It merely

Its exclusion

from consideration by the jury was clearly erroneous.
POINT V
THE COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING THE DEFENDANT TO
CONSECUTIVE PRISON TERMS AND A CONSECUTIVE JAIL SENTENCE.

SEVEN

At the time of sentencing, the court was made aware of the
statutory

provision

at Title 76, Chapter

3, Section

401(4).

Despite that awareness, and despite the clear language of the
statute the court sentenced the defendant to consecutive sentences.
At the time of sentencing, the court was not made aware of this
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court's decision in State v. Swapp, 808 P.2d 115 (Utah App. 1991).
Neither counsel also was aware of the decision at the time of
sentencing.

At the time of the writing of this brief, defendant's

counsel became aware of the case.

The defendant concedes upon

examination of that case that it seems to be determinative.

The

defendant therefore only seeks a clarification from this court that
the maximum time served should be 30 years and the minimum be one
year in accordance with the statute.
CONCLUSION
Appellant submits to the court that the admission of the
illegally

seized

evidence,

the

non-admission

of

the

alibi

testimony, the non-admission of the photograph, and the failure to
allow the defendant's alibi witness to recover for trial all
constitutes reversible error.

Appellant therefore submits that

his conviction should be reversed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this 2Jj~

day of

JuAx.

1992.

ndU^ fti bJiulu^

Alan M. Williams
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
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,

I hereby certify that I hand delivered four true and correct
copies of the foregoing brief of appellant to Paul Van Dam, Utah
State Attorney General, at 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah,
84114 on this 2>{Jr day of J_

vi\y

' 1992 -

dub,.. tti lj.JlnuJ^
Alan M. Williams

ADDENDUM

Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 404, Utah Code Annotated
Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 202, Utah Code Annotated
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
session of stolen goods to support inference of
burglary or other felonious taking, 51 A L.R.
3d 727.
Key Numbers. — Larceny *» 12.

Am. Jur. 2d. — 50 Am. Jur. 2d Larceny
10.
c # j # g . _ 52A C.J.S. Larceny § 4.
A.L.R- — What amounts to "exclusive" pos-

6-6-403. Theft — Evidence to support accusation.
Conduct denominated theft in this part constitutes a single oftense embrace/the separate offenses such as those heretofore known as larceny, larceny
fiyjtrick, larceny by bailees, embezzlement, false pretense, extortion, blackmail, receiving stolen property. An accusation of theft may be supported by
** ence that it was committed in any manner specified in Sections 76-6-404
ugh 76-6-410, subject to the power of the court to ensure a fair trial by
iting a continuance or other appropriate relief where the conduct of the
l&fense would be prejudiced by lack of fair notice or by surprise.
Blistory: <J. 11*63, 76-6-403, enacted by L.
|§73, ch. 196, § 76-6-403; 1974, ch. 32, § 17.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

idence.
(eading and practice,
siving stolen property.
idence.
ngerprint evidence, based on a comparison
. defendants fingerprints with those found at
ie? scene of the crime, along with the testiibny of defendant's accomplice, was sufficient
evidence to find defendant guilty of burglary
&nd theft. State v. Bailey, 712 P.2d 281 (Utah
1985).
Pleading and practice.
Section 76-6-404 is the "general offense of

theft" required to be pled by this section to invoke the provisions of consolidated theft. Once
the prosecution charges a defendant with the
general offense of "theft*' under § 76-6-404, it
may then present its evidence to prove the
theft was committed in any manner specified
in §§ 76-6-404 to 76-6-410. State v. Fowler,
745 P.2d 472 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Receiving stolen property.
Evidence that establishes receiving stolen
property under § 76-6-408 is sufficient to sustain a conviction of theft without the necessity
of establishing theft by taking. State v. Taylor,
570 P.2d 697 (Utah 1977).

76-6-404. Theft — Elements.
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-404, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-404.

Cross-References. — Motor vehicles, special anti-theft laws, §§ 41-1-105 to 14-1-121.
Shoplifting Act, § 78-11-14 et seq
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76-6-201

CRIMINAL CODE
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. — 52 Am. Jur. 2d Malicious
Mischief § 1.

C.J.S. — 54 C.J.S. Malicious or CriminalMischief or Damage to Property § 3.
Key Numbers. — Malicious Mischief «» 1.

PART 2
BURGLARY AND CRIMINAL TRESPASS
76-6-201. Definitions.
For the purposes of this part:
(1) "Building," in addition to its ordinary meaning, means any watercraft, aircraft, trailer, sleeping car, or other structure or vehicle adapted
for overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on business
therein and includes:
(a) Each separately secured or occupied portion of the structure or
vehicle; and
(b) Each structure appurtenant to or connected with the structure
or vehicle.
(2) "Dwelling" means a building which is usually occupied by a person
lodging therein at night, whether or not a person is actually present.
(3) A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon premises when
the premises or any portion thereof at the time of the entry or remaining
are not open to the public and when the actor is not otherwise licensed or
privileged to enter or remain on the premises or such portion thereof.
(4) "Enter" means:
(a) Intrusion of any part of the body; or
(b) Intrusion of any physical object under control of the actor.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-201, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-201.

Cross-References. —- Civil
entry and detainer, § 78-36-1.

provisions,

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 13 Am. Jur. 2d Burglary
§ 1.
C.J.S. — 12A C.J.S. Burglary § 2.
A.L.R. — Maintainability of burglary
charge, where entry into building is made with
consent, 58 A.L.R.4th 335.

What is "building" or "house" within burglary or breaking and entering statute, 68
A.L.R.4th 425.
Key Numbers. — Burglary «=» 1.

76-6-202. Burglary.
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit a felony or theft or
commit an assault on any person.
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a
dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree.
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DEPUTY

HARRY H. SOUVALL #4919
Uintah County Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff
152 East 100 North
Vernal, Utah 84078
Telephone: (801) 781-0770
IN THE EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF UINTAH, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
VS.

:
:

WILLIAM GENE HORTON,

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO QUASH WARRANT
AND SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

:
CASE NO. 911800036 FS

Defendant.

:

This matter came before the Court on the 7th day of
November, 1991 on Defendant's Motion To Quash Warrant and Exclude
Evidence.

The Plaintiff was represented by Harry Souvall, Uintah

County Attorney.

The Defendant was present and represented by

counsel, Alan M. Williams.

Also present was Defendant, Dennis

Session, who was represented by his attorney, Keith Chiara. The
Court, having heard the testimony of the witnesses and the
arguments of counsel, and being fully apprised thereof issues the
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the
action, as this is a Motion To Suppress filed pursuant to Rule
12,

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
2.

On or about the 16th day of June, 1991, the Dinah Bowl

Bowling Alley in Vernal and two shops located therein, The Acute
Cut and The Dinah Barber Salon, were also broken into and thefts
occurred in each of the respective businesses.
3. On or about July 8, 1991, Detective Joe Boren of the
Vernal City Police Department, received a phone call from a
confidential informant, who asked not to be identified.

This

informant stated to Officer Boren that they had information
regarding the burglary of the bowling alley in Vernal, which had
recently been broken into.

The caller then asked if a business

in Duchesne had been broken into, where VCR's had been taken.
Detective Boren testified that the caller stated that he or she
had overheard a conversation between Vickie and Billy Horton.
During this conversation, the caller overheard Billy Horton say
that he had broken into the Vernal bowling alley.

The caller

also overheard Billy Horton say something about VCR's from
Duchesne.

The caller then advised Detective Boren that the

suspect, Billy Horton, was released from the Utah State Prison
2

about one year ago. The suspect was described as being between
the ages of 35 and 38. The suspect drove a blue, late model Ford
Mustang, Utah License Number 101AKE, to the Vernal area to commit
the crimes.

The caller further informed Detective Boren that

the suspect had been convicted of several burglaries in the past.
The caller further informed Officer Boren that the suspect
resides at 1175 North 1500 West in Salt Lake City, Utah.
4.

Detective Boren was able to locate a drivers license

issued to William G. Horton of 1175 North 1500 West in Salt Lake
City, Utah.

Detective Boren was also able to obtain a criminal

history on William Gene Horton and said criminal history revealed
several arrests and convictions for burglary and other crimes.
5.

Detective Boren further testified that later on the same

day, he received a phone call from the informant.

The informant

stated the suspect had been in possession of several boxes of
video tapes, Nintendo games, some VCR's and several boxes of
packaged meat.

The informant further stated that the suspect had

been selling lots of cartons of Marlboro cigarettes.

The

informant stated that they thought that a person from Vernal may
have been involved with the burglaries and stated that they would
call back with information if they were able to obtain the same.
6.

Detective Boren further testified that about three hours

later, also on July 8, 1991, he received another call from the
3

same informant.

The informant stated that they thought the other

suspect was named Steven.

The informant further stated that the

suspect lived in Vernal and had been in prison with Billy Horton.
The informant further described the second suspect as "blonde,
stocky build, married with one child".
7.

Detective Boren testified that at approximately 22:30

hours on the aforementioned date, he received another phone call
from the informant.

The informant stated the second suspect's

name was Brian - not Steven.

The informant further stated that

Brian had been released from prison and his child was
approximately six months old.
8.

On or about the 9th day of July, 1991, Officer Boren

contacted Brent Cardall of the Department of Corrections.
Cardall reported that he only had two Brians listed in his office
- Brian Harris from California and Brian Winslow.

Brian Winslow

had been in the Utah State Prison and had been released in March
of 1990. Brent Cardall described Brian Winslow as "blonde,
stocky build and having one child approximately six months old".
Mr. Cardall further relayed that Brian winslow had an extensive
criminal history, including the crime of burglary and other
property crimes against a person.
9.

On July 9, 1991, at approximately 14:00 hours, Officer

Boren received a call from the informant.
4

The informant stated

that the second suspect in Vernal was named Brian Winslow.

The

informant further advised Officer Boren that Billy Horton was in
Vernal and was staying with Winslow for the next two or three
days.
10.

Based upon the above informationf Officer Boren

obtained a Search Warrant on the 10th day of July from the Third
Circuit Court in Salt Lake County and from the Eighth Circuit
Court in Vernal to search the homes of William Gene Horton and
Brian Winslow.

The search of William Horton1s home uncovered

evidence that appeared to have been taken from Dinah Bowl, The
Acute Cut, and Wilkerson's in Duchesne.
11.

After being read his Miranda rights, Co-Defendant,

Brian Winslow, confessed to the crimes and implicated the
Defendant, William Horton, Dennis Sessions and Vickie Horton as
participants in either the first set of burglaries on May 26,
1991 and the second set of burglaries on June 15, 1991 and June
16, 1991. Mr. Winslow's confession and information regarding Mr.
Horton's involvement in the crime were received by the officer
after the warrant had been executed on the Horton residence
12.

Detective Boren states that he had information from the

informant that the items identified as stolen property were seen
in the driveway of the William Horton residence, but he failed to
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include that information in the Affidavit of Probable Cause to
obtain the Search Warrant for the residence of William G. Horton.
13.

At the Hearing, Officer Boren testified that the reason

this information was not included was that the specific place and
time of when the property was seen in the driveway could have
been used to identify the informant if the Defendant had that
information.

Therefore, the fact that the stolen property was

seen in the driveway of William Horton's residence was excluded
from the Affidavit.
14.

Officer Boren is an experienced officer with the search

warrant process.

He has drafted or assisted in the drafting of

at least two hundred search warrant affidavits.

He is familiar

with the requirements for stating in the affidavit the location
of the suspected contraband, and the factual basis for the
request to search in that location.

Officer Boren knew that he

had left out that information in his affidavit.
15.

Officer Boren invited several officers who were

investigating burglaries, which were not mentioned in the search
warrantf to accompany him in the execution of the search warrant
knowing that each officer's purpose was to search for items from
those unrelated and unidentified burglaries.

Officer Boren

allowed this despite his knowledge that there was nothing in his
affidavit or warrant that mentioned those burglaries.
6

16.

Officer Boren included, in his list of suspected

contraband attached to his affidavit/ several items which had
been taken during burglaries other than the ones described in the
affidavit.
17.

Officer Boren withheld information which he had

concerning the relationship of the informer to the defendant
which may have had substantial impact on the determination of the
credibility of that informant.

He also withheld other details

given to him by the informant.
18.

While Officer Boren had information which stated that

contraband had been seen in the driveway of the Horton residence,
he did not present any evidence as to when that evidence was seen
nor if it was still there.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Affidavit in support of the warrant did not contain

information as to why the property seized would be found at the
William G. Horton residence and, therefore, there was
insufficient probable cause, is a matter of law, to establish a
probable cause for a search.
2.

The information received from the informant is

sufficiently reliable and was verified by Officer Boren to be
relied upon in the issuance of a warrant.
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Furthermore, there was

sufficient probable cause, based upon the information, to believe
that William G. Horton had committed the crimes.
3.

Officer Boren withheld the necessary information to

establish a nexus between the crime and the stolen property being
at his residence because he was attempting to protect the
identification of an informant.

Had the information been

included in the affidavit, there would have been sufficient
probable cause to search the residence.

The officer was acting

in good faith in the request for a warrant and the execution of
the warrant and the Court upholds the search under the Good Faith
Exception

search rule requirement established by the United

States Supreme Court in The United States v. Leon.
DATED this /<j&Aday of February, 1992.

(\ J&**teo <2—
DENNIS L. DRANEY
District Court Judge
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